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This paper extends the standard human capital model with real options. Real options influence 
investment behavior when risky investments in human capital are irreversible and individuals 
can affect the timing of the investment. Option values make individuals more reluctant to 
invest in human capital and, as a result, required returns on the investment increase. Real 
options may help to explain a larger human capital premium for higher education, smaller 
responsiveness of higher education investments to financial incentives, and larger sensitivity 
of higher education to low-return outcomes and human capital risks. Higher tax rates (or 
lower subsidies) depress human capital investments, but to a lesser extent than in the standard 
human capital model. A flat income tax remains neutral if education expenditures are fully 
deductible. 
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1 Introduction
The human capital model as developed by Mincer (1958, 1962), Schultz (1963) and Becker
(1964) is by now the mainstream framework to analyze education and training decisions.
According to the human capital theory, individuals will maximize their life-time utility
by choosing their investments in education and training optimally. In the absence of
income risks and capital market failures, separation between consumption decisions and
investments in human capital holds. An optimizing individual demands that the marginal
return to his investment in human capital is at least equal to the marginal costs of making
the investments. At the optimum, the rate of return to human capital investment should
be equal to the real safe rate of interest. In practice, however, this is not the case.
Observed returns are typically larger than the risk-free rate as Palacios-Huerta (2004,
2006) has shown in a novel ﬁnance approach. High returns are also consistently found
in the empirical labor literature. See for excellent overviews Card (1999), Ashenfelter et
al. (1999), and Harmon et al. (2003). This begs the question why the private returns to
education are so high.
Standard arguments to explain the high private return to education are often based
on liquidity constraints. Capital markets may not make suﬃcient borrowing available
due to enforcement and information problems (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). With liquidity
constraints, consumption and investment decisions cannot be separated and individuals
will invest sub-optimally in human capital. As a result, the rates of return on human
investments are not equal to the rate of return on safe assets, and there will not be a
separation between consumption and investment decisions. The empirical plausibility of
liquidity constraints to explain high returns to human capital investments is controversial,
however. Carneiro and Heckman (2003), Cameron and Taber (2004), Plug and Vijverberg
(2004) and others ﬁnd that liquidity constraints only have a slight impact on enrolment
in higher education and seems to be insuﬃcient to explain high observed rates of return
to education.1
Income risk may also justify a high rate of return. In the absence of insurance markets,
risks in human capital returns are not insurable, and there is no separation of consump-
tion and investment decisions. Levhari and Weiss (1973) have shown that the standard
optimality condition for investments in human capital should include a risk-premium
when the human capital returns are uncertain. This is analogous to the CAPM-model
used in ﬁnance. Risk averse individuals want to be compensated for income risks. Indeed,
Palacios-Huerta (2004, 2006) ﬁnds that human capital returns include a substantial risk
premium. Many papers ﬁnd evidence for risk compensation in wages, see the overview by
Hartog (2005). Nevertheless, the high return on human capital is suggestive of a human
capital premium puzzle, just like in the ﬁnance literature (see e.g., Mehra and Prescott,
1Palacios-Huerta (2006) suggests that borrowing and solvency constraints may explain up to ﬁfty
percent of the human capital premium if these were indeed the main frictions in the capital market.
12003). Palacios-Huerta (2006) has shown that risk alone cannot explain the diﬀerence
between the real return on human capital and the risk-free interest rate. Only implausibly
large coeﬃcients of relative risk aversion, ranging from 30–60, generate a risk-premium
on human capital investments that is consistent with the data. Judd (2000) argues that,
if idiosyncratic income risks are so important, governments or markets would look for in-
stitutions to insure these risks. Apparently, neither is the case. Both private and public
insurance are not likely to emerge if moral hazard renders the income risks endogenous
rather than idiosyncratic, see also Judd (2000) and Sinn (1998).
Another empirical puzzle is that the covariance between earnings or employment and
the marginal investment in education appears to be negative, see also Gould et al. (2000),
Hartog and Diaz-Serrano (2002), and Belzil and Hansen (2004). Also, Palacios-Huerta
(2004, 2006) empirically ﬁnds that the human capital premium is lowered as workers
become more educated. This suggests that, although human capital investment is risky
on average, higher levels of human capital hedge against labor market risks on the margin,
cf. Levhari and Weiss (1973). Rubinstein and Tsiddon (2001) show that the negative
correlation between education and unemployment or earnings risk vanishes, once controls
for parental education are included in the analysis. Earnings and unemployment risks
could then be driven mainly by parental or even genetic transfers of skills, rather than
market risks. Indeed, Cunha et al. (2004) demonstrate that a large part of risk in labor
market outcomes can be traced back to non-observed heterogeneity, not to market risk.
These empirical ﬁndings also substantially weaken the case for a substantial risk premium
for human capital investments at the margin.
This paper demonstrates that real options could provide another explanation as to
why returns are high for higher educational investments. Real options are present in
irreversible and risky investments in which there is a possibility to inﬂuence the timing of
the investment. Human capital is generally regarded as a non-liquid asset (e.g., Friedman,
1962). It is therefore impossible to recover forgone earnings and tuition expenses by selling
the asset after the investment has been made. Due to the illiquidity of human capital,
investments are sunk. Individuals can, however, inﬂuence the timing of the decision to
invest in risky higher education. This implies that individuals have an option to wait for
better information regarding the returns (or costs) of the investment. Individuals who
do not wait, and immediately invest in higher education, give up a valuable option to
wait, which must be compensated with higher returns. In equilibrium, the option value
of postponing the investment drives up returns to investment in human capital, which
could explain why returns are high. Moreover, high returns are an equilibrium outcome
in the presence of perfect capital and insurance markets. Palacios-Huerta (2006) shows
that about two-thirds of the observed human capital premium could be the result of
the illiquidity of human capital if short-sale constraints would be the relevant market
imperfection. These ﬁndings can, however, also suggest that option values are important.
Indeed, the illiquidity of the investment is the prime reason why the real option emerges.
Therefore, even with risk neutral individuals, rates of return to human capital investments
would increase when investments in human capital are illiquid and subject to short-sale
constraints.
The option value of postponing investment is relevant whenever individuals can in-
ﬂuence the timing of the investment. From a theoretical perspective, it would therefore
apply to all types of investment in human capital. In practice, however, it is relevant
mainly for higher education where, by the nature of voluntary choice, there is indeed a
possibility to inﬂuence the timing of the investment. It is not likely that waiting op-
2tions could explain a human capital premium for lower, compulsory levels of education.
Nevertheless, there is potentially also a waiting option associated with education levels
below obligatory school entrance ages when parents have the possibility to decide when
to send their children to kindergarten, preschool or early childhood programs. This paper
nevertheless conﬁnes the analysis to higher education only.
As a side step, this paper also analyzes the eﬀects of (progressive) income taxes and
education subsidies when options in higher educational investments are important. If all
costs of education are tax deductible and there is a ﬂat tax, there is no eﬀect of the tax
system on option values to wait with investment. The neutrality of ﬂat income taxes with
full deductibility of investments in the standard human capital framework (cf. Heckman,
1976) therefore carries over to the real option model of human capital investment. With
imperfect deductibility, higher income taxes do indeed discourage human capital invest-
ments, but to a lesser extent than in the human capital model because higher ﬂat taxes
reduce the value of option to wait. Similarly, education subsidies increase investments in
human capital. Again, investments in education are less sensitive to subsidies due to the
reduced option value compared to the standard human capital model. Hence, investment
in higher education is less elastic to taxes and subsidies when waiting options are more
valuable.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy describes some earlier papers
and how this paper relates to the literature. Section 3 describes the model of irreversible
investment in higher education. Section 4 derives the main results and performs compar-
ative static analysis. Section 5 concludes.
2 Earlier literature
Comay et al. (1973), Heckman et al. (2006), Hogan and Walker (2005), and Leuven and
Oosterbeek (2001) have earlier pursued the option approach in a human capital frame-
work. Comay et al. (1973) and Heckman et al. (2006) analyze so called growth options
in human capital investments. Education is seen as a sequential multi-stage investment
process in which some uncertainty is resolved after each stage. This uncertainty gives rise
to option values of being able to enter the next stage of the process. Only by ﬁnishing the
current stage of the education process, students can enter the next stage, for example,
from primary to secondary education. Human capital generated in each stage is subject
to short-sale constraints and the individual cannot sell it in case the investment turns out
to be unproﬁtable. Hence, the growth option in this setting stems from the right, but not
the obligation, to continue to the next stage of the investment process if the irreversible
cost of completing the current stage is incurred.
In Comay et al. (1973) the uncertainty at each stage of investment is generated by an
exogenous probability to drop-out, while there are no income risks in the remainder of the
life-cycle. Consequently, continuation to the next stage is more likely if the option value
of entering the next stage is large. Heckman et al. (2006) endogenize this probability
to drop out by explicitly deriving the decision to enter the next stage from a human
capital investment model. A stochastic shock to the returns (or costs) of the investment
at each stage of the investment process induces individuals either to continue to the next
stage or to quit after the current stage. Due to positive option values, the real return to
education is much higher for any stage of the education process, except for the last stage
in which there is no option value of continuation. In equilibrium, individuals would be
3willing to accept lower rates of return on their human capital investments than real rates
of return on ﬁnancial investments with similar risk characteristics if these human capital
investments also yield valuable growth options to enter the next stage. Consequently,
growth options cannot resolve the human capital premium puzzle.
Hogan and Walker (2005) and the current paper analyze timing options in human cap-
ital investment. The value of a timing option originates from the possibility to postpone
investments to a later date when more information is available. That is, the individual
has the right, but not the obligation, to make the irreversible decision to invest at a later
date. Timing options are conceptually diﬀerent from growth options, see also Dixit and
Pindyck (1994). Timing options emerge when the individual can inﬂuence the timing of
their decisions, which is not possible in Comay et al. (1973) and Heckman et al. (2006).
Moreover, the value of a timing option does not require that investment in human capital
is a sequential investment process. Indeed, it can be a one-oﬀ investment.
Hogan and Walker (2005) analyze an optimal stopping problem. Individuals are
enrolled in education and they have to decide when to enter the labor market from which
uncertain returns to education are generated. The decision to stop learning and to start
working is irreversible, and the student gives up the option to enter the labor market at a
later date. The costs of entering the labor market consist of the forgone stream of utility
beneﬁts of staying in education for a longer time. In the face of fundamental uncertainty,
there is a waiting option to enter the labor market at a later date when more information
has arrived on the returns to the human capital investment. The student stops learning,
and gives up his option to enter the labor market a later date, only when the returns are
suﬃciently high. When the value of the option increases, for example due to larger labor
market risk, investment in education is boosted.
Their ﬁndings could be criticized for a number of reasons. First, in practice students
can re-enter education at a later age which suggests that the option to go to work is not
really irreversible. Second, the most important results of Hogan and Walker (2005) are
quite sensitive to the assumption of positive utility beneﬁts of education. The option
value would disappear when non-monetary utility beneﬁts are zero, or even negative, and
everyone would immediately start to work. Although utility beneﬁts could indeed be
relevant, opportunity and direct costs are probably more important sunk costs associated
with educational investments. The reason is that a large human capital premium is
rather diﬃcult to reconcile with non-monetary beneﬁts being more important than non-
monetary costs. High returns should compensate for high (net) non-monetary costs
(Judd, 2000).2 Third, the fact that non-pecuniary beneﬁts are untaxed explains why
(progressive) income taxes boost human capital investments. Education is implicitly
subsidized under a ﬂat income tax, because the total (monetary and non-monetary)
returns are subject to a lower eﬀective tax rate than the total costs (forgone earnings),
see also Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005). This is not counterintuitive, but has little to do
with options, in contrast to what the authors seem to suggest. Options tend to make
the investment decision less responsive to taxation, but they do not determine the sign
of the tax impact on human capital investments. Fourth, also the model of Hogan and
Walker (2005) goes in the wrong direction in explaining a high human capital premium
2See the substantial evidence in Carneiro and Heckman (2003) for the importance of non-monetary
costs, especially for lower education levels and minority groups. Findings by Palacios-Huerta (2004, 2006)
are consistent with this. Further, drop-out rates in higher education are around 20-60% in Western
countries, see the OECD-ﬁgures in Jacobs and Van der Ploeg (2006). Apparently, studying entails
substantial non-monetary costs in the form of eﬀort.
4because individuals are willing to accept a lower rate of return on their investments when
the option to enter the labor market at a later date becomes more valuable.
In contrast to Hogan and Walker (2005), this paper starts from the premise that the
decision to start learning is the irreversible decision, not the decision to start working.
The returns (or costs) of the investment in human capital are uncertain. Waiting to enroll
in higher education has the beneﬁt of gaining more information on the returns (or costs)
of the investment. The option value stems from the fact that one could wait to enroll
and only do so when the returns are suﬃciently large. The sunk cost of the investment
is not the lost beneﬁt of staying in education, but the forgone labor earnings and tuition
costs while in school.
One other option type has been analyzed in the human capital literature. Leuven and
Oosterbeek (2001) consider the presence of real options to terminate a worker-employer
relationship in a setting with ﬁrm speciﬁc investments in on-the-job training, as in Becker
(1964). Uncertainty on returns from irreversible ﬁrm-speciﬁc investments in OJT gives
option values if the ﬁrm can lay oﬀ the worker so as to avoid a bad outcome. This
option value raises the ﬁrm’s returns and the bargained wage will rise. Further, under
uncertainty, the ﬁrm would not bear all the costs of speciﬁc investments in OJT in contrast
to the certainty case studied by Becker (1964).
3 Model
The model of Dixit and Pindyck (1994, ch.2) forms the basis of this paper. A risk neutral
individual considers the discrete decision to make a risky investment in higher educa-
tion. Capital and insurance markets are perfect, although the latter assumption is not
needed with risk neutral individuals. The investment in higher education is completely
irreversible. Investments in higher education mainly consist of forgone labor earnings and
tuition costs. It is quite reasonable to assume that there is not a way of getting your
money back once working time is forgone and tuition fees have been paid. The investment
in education is therefore a sunk cost.
The returns of this investment are uncertain due to input and output uncertainty
(Levhari and Weiss, 1973). Input uncertainty arises when the individual does not (fully)
know his ability to complete the investment and to ﬁnish his study (in time). Failure to
complete (in time) lowers the returns to the investment.3 Alternatively, the individual
faces uncertainty as regards his capacities to fully reap the returns to his human capital
when choosing a particular type of study. Individuals may unintendedly choose the wrong
study that does not match with their abilities or interests. Output uncertainty relates to
uncertainty in the returns to human capital investments due to changing labor market
conditions after graduation, for example the probability to ﬁnd a job, the risks of sectoral
shifts and business cycles.
The individual may decide to enrol in higher education directly or he may postpone
the investment for one year and work in the labor market during this year. Therefore,
the individual has the option to wait in the presence of uncertainty. After one year, all
uncertainty is revealed and there is no longer an option to wait. This model is probably
more suited to describe the eﬀects of input uncertainty (on ability) because it is less likely
that all output uncertainty (on labor market conditions) is fully revealed after one year.
3One could also interpret this uncertainty as cost uncertainty, but that will not qualitatively aﬀect
the results of this paper, see also Dixit and Pindyck (1994, ch.2).
5This is the simplest set-up possible to analyze the consequences of options in human
capital investments. All qualitative results will nevertheless carry over to more general
continuous time case in which uncertainty is never fully revealed and the individual can
always decide to invest in higher education at later dates (see also Dixit and Pindyck,
1994).4
The option to postpone the investment is analogous to a ﬁnancial call option. The
student has the right but not the obligation to buy an asset, i.e., human capital, at some
future date. When the student decides to enroll immediately, he exercises his option to
buy the asset and gives up the opportunity to wait and see whether the returns to the
investment have improved.
The total investment consists of forgone labor earnings and the direct costs of higher
education while enrolled. Forgone earnings are gross earnings per year net of taxes
(1 − τ)w where τ is the tax rate and w is the gross yearly wage. Taxes reduce the
opportunity costs of enrolling in higher education. There are also direct costs such as
tuition fees, books, materials and computers. Direct costs are (1 − s)k where k is the
monetary cost of one year of higher education and s is the ﬂat subsidy rate. Both forgone
labor earnings and tuition costs are not time-varying for simplicity. It takes T years to
graduate, hence the present value of total costs I of investing in higher education at the




(1 − τ)w + (1 − s)k
(1 + r)t = (1 − τ)ω + (1 − s)κ, (1)









present value of gross forgone earnings and direct costs of education, respectively. Perfect
capital markets are assumed so that the individual can always borrow at rate r to ﬁnance
investments in education I.
The time-horizon for the individual is assumed to be inﬁnite for analytical simplicity.
The qualitative results readily extend to the case with a ﬁnite horizon, however. When
the individual invests with graduation at time t = 0 the expected return to the investment
in higher education is R0 each year from t = 0 to t = ∞. The future return is uncertain.
At time t = 1 the return either increases to R1 ≡ (1 + υ)R0 with probability q and the
expected return decreases to R1 ≡ (1 − δ)R0 with probability (1 − q). After t = 1 all
uncertainty is revealed and the return remains ﬁxed at R1 from t = 1 to t = ∞. υ is the
upward swing and δ is the downward swing in the returns on the investment. The return
on the investment is taxed at rate θ which may be higher than the marginal rate τ. In
that case, marginal tax rates are increasing with income.
If it is only possible to invest immediately (and graduate at t = 0), the prospective
student invests in higher education if the present value of labor earnings V0 is larger than
the total costs of the investment in higher education I. Otherwise, the student does not
go to higher education. The net-present value rule is equivalent to the standard human
capital model.
4The option to postpone the investment is analogous to a ﬁnancial call option. The student has the
right but not the obligation to buy an asset, i.e., human capital, at some future date. When the student
decides to enroll immediately, he exercises his option to buy the asset and gives up the opportunity to
wait and see whether the returns to the investment have improved.
6The present value of labor earnings of investing with graduation at time t = 0 is




(1 + r)t (2)
=
(1 − θ)R0(1 + r + q(υ + δ) − δ)
r
.
Ω0 equals the net pay-oﬀ from the investment in higher education. Ω0 equals the net
present value of the investment if the investment is undertaken or zero if the net present
value is negative and the investment is not undertaken. Formally, it is written as
Ω0 ≡ max{V0 − I,0} (3)
= max

(1 − θ)R0(1 + r + q(υ + δ) − δ)
r
− (1 − τ)ω − (1 − s)κ,0

.
If investment with graduation at t = 1 is also possible, the individual has the option
to wait one year and see whether returns have gone up or down because uncertainty is
revealed. Waiting one year, and thereby foregoing a one-year return, only makes sense
if one can avoid a bad outcome which generates a lower net present value when the
investment is made.
If the investment is postponed and human capital earns a high return at graduation
date t = 1, the net present value of the investment in education with at graduation at
t = 1 will be equal to
F 1 ≡ max






(1 − θ)(1 + υ)R0(1 + r)
r
− (1 − τ)ω − (1 − s)κ,0

,
where the upper bar denotes a high return outcome. If the investment is postponed and
human capital earns a low return at graduation date t = 1, the net present value of the
investment in education with graduation at t = 1 will be
F 1 ≡ max{V 1 − I,0} (5)
= max

(1 − θ)(1 − δ)R0(1 + r)
r
− (1 − τ)ω − (1 − s)κ,0

,
where the lower bars denote outcomes when the return is low.
Now, the whole investment opportunity, i.e., investing either now or tomorrow has a
value F0 which is equal to the maximum return of the investment when the individual
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V0 − I =
(1 − θ)R0(1 + r + q(υ + δ) − δ)
r
− (1 − τ)ω − (1 − s)κ, (7)
7V 1 − I
1 + r
=
(1 − θ)(1 + υ)R0
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V 1 − I
1 + r
=
(1 − θ)(1 − δ)R0
r
−
(1 − τ)ω + (1 − s)κ
1 + r
. (9)
The value of the option to wait O is the diﬀerence between the value of the investment
opportunity F0 which covers the choice between investing now or next year and the net
present value of investing Ω0 directly:
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To derive simple analytical results, the formal analysis is restricted to the case in which
immediate investment has a positive present value, i.e., max{V0 − I,0} = V0 − I > 0,
the good outcome yields a positive present value, so that max

V 1 − I,0
	
= V 1 − I and
the bad outcome yields a negative present value, and max{V 1 − I,0} = 0.5 With these





V 1 − I
1 + r

− (V0 − I). (11)





the option to wait is of no value and O = 0. In that case, it is
optimal to go enrol in higher education directly if the present value of direct investment





the option to wait generates suﬃcient value
and the investment will be postponed for one year. In that case, the individual will only
invest if the returns turn out to be high and the individual will not invest at all if the
returns turn out to be low.
4 To invest or not to invest in higher education?
This section derives the comparative statics of changing the parameters of the model on
the willingness to invest in higher education and the willingness to postpone investment in
higher education. The value of the option (W) depends on the probability of an upswing
(q), the costs (I), the interest rate (r) and the gross present values of the investment
in higher education now or tomorrow (V0 and V1). These costs and present values are,
in turn, determined by the return on the investment (R0), the sizes of the up- and
downswings in the returns (υ and δ), the costs of forgone earnings and tuition (ω and κ),
the interest rates, the taxes (τ, θ) and the subsidy (s).
4.1 Options values and returns
R∗
0 is the critical value of the average return to the investment in higher education at
which individuals are indiﬀerent between directly going to higher education or postponing
5Little generality is lost by imposing these restrictions. All analytical results can be shown to be
robust using graphical analysis of the general model without restrictions.
8one year and only going to higher education if the return turns out to be high. R∗
0 follows









(1 + r − q)
(r + (1 − q)(1 − δ))
rI
(1 + r)(1 − θ)
. (12)
Recall, I ≡ (1 − τ)ω + (1 − s)κ.
There is also a critical lower bound on the return R0 below which the individual will
never consider to enroll in higher education, not even if the individual has the option to










(1 + r)(1 − θ)
. (13)
The required return at which the student will never invest is lower than return at which
the student postpones the investment: R0 < R∗
0.
The minimum required return R0 can be compared with the required return ˆ R0 that
would make the net-present value of investing higher education non-negative if the option
to delay the investment was not available, i.e., when V0 − I = 0:
ˆ R0 =
1 + r
(1 + r + q(υ + δ) − δ)
rI
(1 + r)(1 − θ)
. (14)
This return is larger than the return if the option to wait is available, i.e., ˆ R0 > R0.
Having the option to wait has positive value, and it reduces the required return to consider
the investment in higher education. At the same time, the return at which individuals
invest directly can be shown to be larger than the return which would induce investments
when options are not available: R∗
0 > ˆ R0. As a result, individuals are more reluctant to
invest directly in the option model than in the standard human capital model.
The value of the opportunity to go to higher education, F0 is a piecewise-linear func-
tion of the average return R0 to the investment:
F0 = max

(1 − θ)(1 + r + q(υ + δ) − δ)
r
R0 − I,







If we subtract the value of immediate investment without the option Ω0 (assumed to be
positive) we get the value O of the option to wait:
O = max

(1 − θ)(1 + r + q(υ + δ) − δ)
r
R0 − I,













As long as the option O has positive value, i.e., when R0 < R∗
0, the value of the option
declines when the return to higher education R0 increases: ∂O
∂R0 < 0.6 When the present
value of direct investment is positive, the option becomes less valuable as returns in-
crease because the individual looses positive returns of immediate investment. The value
6If direct investment yields a negative present value, i.e.,
(1−θ)(1+r+q(υ+δ)−δ)
r R0 < I, the value of
the option increases with the return: ∂O
∂R0 > 0. The intuition is that the option to wait increases in
value when the returns increase because there are no opportunity costs of waiting to invest if the direct
investment yields a negative present value, and the individual would not invest at t = 0 anyhow.









r ) when returns R0 increase. Therefore, higher
returns R0 reduce the value of the option and investing directly becomes relatively more
proﬁtable. As the return passes the critical level R∗
0 immediate investment takes place
and the option to wait is given up. An increase in the ﬁnancial rewards of the investment
will induce smaller eﬀects on the decision to invest when options are valuable than with-
out, since ∂V0/∂R0 > ∂F0/∂R0. In other words, the option approach predicts smaller
sensitivity of human capital investments with respect to the returns than the standard
human capital model.
Note also that the value of the option O is positively related to the required return
R∗
0 to make immediate investment optimal (if O > 0). The required return R∗
0 increases
if the return of the whole investment opportunity F0 increases, or of the return of direct
investment Ω0 decreases. In both cases, option values to wait with immediate investment
increase. In other words, if the required return to make immediate investment in human
capital optimal increases, the option value in the investment opportunity increases. This
property will be useful later on when discussing the comparative statics.
Figure 1 graphs the value of the option to wait to go to higher education as a function
of the average return on the investment for a particular parameterization of the model.
Parameters have been deliberately chosen to illustrate the role of option values and no
empirical inferences can be drawn from this example. The real interest rate is set at
r = 8%. Skilled workers earn R0 = 15.000 euro more than unskilled workers who are
assumed to earn 30.000 euro per year on average. Suppose that with a 50% probability
the return R0 is 50% lower or higher, i.e., q = υ = δ = 0.5. That is, the skill-premium
R1 equals either 22.500 euro or 7.500 euro per year. Assume that taxes are ﬂat at 40%
and that education subsidies are such that all costs are eﬀectively tax deductible, i.e.,
θ = τ = s = 0.4. The direct costs of education are set to 10.000 euro per year. Below
R0 = 9.613 euro the individual will not invest at all. Between R0 and R∗
0 = 25.343 euro
the individual waits for one year and does not invest directly. The individual only invests
at t = 1 if the return turns out to be high. When the return is above R∗
0 the individual
will always invest directly and gives up the option to wait. For example, if R0 = 15.000
euro, the net present value of direct investment equals 4.702 euro. Investment in higher
education is optimal according to the standard human capital model. However, the value
of the option to postpone investment is more than ﬁve times larger and equals 25.600 euro.
Therefore, the investment should not be undertaken immediately. The reason is that when
the individual invests immediately, he gives up his option to wait for a better outcome
which is of positive value. A negative present value of the total investment opportunity
results if the costs of giving up the option are subtracted from the positive present value
of immediate investment. The real present value of the immediate investment is not 4.702
but 4.702 − 25.600 = −20.898 euro instead.
4.2 Options values and the cost of investment
Higher costs of the investment in higher education I raise the critical return to induce
immediate investment R∗








0. The intuition is that when the costs of investment increase, the opportunity costs of
waiting (i.e., having a one year extra return) decrease more than the beneﬁt of waiting
(i.e., only invest if the return is high). Higher costs of education therefore increase the
option value of waiting. See also ﬁgure 2 where the option value O increases as long as
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the net present value of immediate investment in human capital remains positive.
Higher costs also raise the critical value of the return R0 below which the investment






See also ﬁgure 2. This result is analogous to the impact of higher costs on a higher re-
quired threshold return in the standard human capital model. Therefore, higher costs of
investment result in lower investment in human capital, both because individuals would
not consider the investment and, because they tend to be more reluctant to invest imme-
diately as the option value of waiting increases.
4.3 Option values and the probability of high returns
Diﬀerentiation of the required return to invest immediately (12) with respect to the
probability of success q gives
∂R∗
0
∂q = − rδ
(r+(1−q)(1−δ))2
rI
(1+r)(1−θ) < 0. Therefore, if the
probability of success increases, the opportunity costs of waiting in terms of missed returns
increase. At the same time, the option value of waiting diminishes because the beneﬁt
of avoiding the low return outcome is lower because the low return outcome is less likely
to occur. For both reasons, the critical value R∗
0 decreases if the probability of a success
increases. See also ﬁgure 3.
A higher probability of success has no eﬀect on the minimum required return to
consider the whole investment opportunity
∂R0
∂q = 0. The intuition is that option values
are only determined by the probability of a downswing, not an upswing, see also below.
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4.4 Option values and riskiness in returns
Increasing the probability q of a good outcome both increases the return and reduces
the risk of the investment at the same time. To isolate the eﬀect of larger risk without
changing the expected return, mean preserving increases in the spread of returns are
considered. To keep mean returns ﬁxed, the downswing and the upswing are linearly
related, i.e., q(1 + υ) = −(1 − q)(1 − δ).
Note that (12) only depends on the downswing δ. Diﬀerentiation gives the eﬀect







(1+r)(1−θ) > 0. Therefore, increasing risk increases the return at which
individuals want to invest directly. The intuition is that the option value of waiting O
increases when the spread increases. The individual can reap the beneﬁts of a higher
potential upswing while avoiding the larger downward risks by not investing in that case.
See also ﬁgure 4.
The required return for immediate investment (12) does not depend on the upward
swing υ or the probability of a successful outcome q. Only the size of the bad outcome δ
and the probability of the bad outcome 1−q determine whether individuals want to invest
directly or not. This is the so called ‘bad news principle’, see also Dixit and Pindyck
(1994). The option to wait is only valuable because it allows the individual to avoid the
consequences of bad news.
Eaton and Rosen (1980) also ﬁnd that higher income risks have a negative eﬀect on
investments in human capital. In that paper, however, individuals are risk averse and
therefore want a risk-premium on their investments in human capital. In the current
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set-up with risk neutral individuals, the individuals require a premium on the return to
give up a valuable option.
A higher risk has a negative eﬀect on the minimum required return to consider the
whole investment opportunity:
∂R0
∂υ = − 1
(1+υ)2
rI
(1+r)(1−θ) < 0. The intuition is that with a
mean-preserving spread, the larger option value lowers the critical return to consider the
investment.
4.5 Option values and income taxes
The eﬀects of taxes on returns and forgone earnings on the required return to induce
immediate investments follow from diﬀerentiation of (12) with respect to θ and τ. The







(1+r)(1−θ)2 > 0. A higher
‘top rate’ θ makes students less willing to invest directly, both because returns are lower
and because option values increase. A higher tax on future earnings increases the option
value O because the returns on immediate investments decrease faster than the returns
on postponed investments. See ﬁgure 5. Note that we have set the direct costs to zero
for illustrative purposes (k = 0).As in the standard human capital model, the top rate







A higher tax rate on forgone labor earnings τ decreases the threshold return above







(1+r)(1−θ) < 0. The intu-
ition is equivalent to lowering the costs of the investment I discussed previously. Higher
taxes on forgone earnings increase the opportunity costs of waiting more than the beneﬁt









0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Upswing (= downdownswing) as a % of the average return
V0-I = NPV immediate investment E[(V1-I)/(1+r)] = NPV later investment 
F0 = Value investment opportunity O = Value option
Parameters: r = 8%, R0 = 15.000, q = 0.5, θ = τ = s = 0.4, ω = 145.998 and κ = 48.666.
of waiting. The option value of waiting O decreases and the critical threshold for imme-
diate investments R∗
0 decreases. See also ﬁgure 2. The required return to consider the
investment in human capital also decreases as can be expected from the standard human
capital model:
∂R0




Suppose that there is a ﬂat income tax (τ = θ) and all costs of education are eﬀectively
tax deductible (s = τ). In the absence of option values, the tax system is neutral with
respect to investments in human capital because all costs and returns of the investment
are reduced at the same rate (see e.g. Heckman, 1976; Bovenberg and Jacobs, 2005).







= 0. Therefore, the
classical neutrality of ﬂat tax rates with complete deductibility of investment costs on
human capital investments carries over to the current set-up with option values.
This contrasts with Eaton and Rosen (1980) where distorting proportional taxes are
optimally positive with risk-averse investors. A progressive tax system substitutes for
missing insurance markets and thereby reduces the required risk-premium on human
capital investments. Hogan and Walker (2005) ﬁnd positive eﬀects of taxes on human
capital investment in their option approach. Their ﬁnding is the result of non-monetary
beneﬁts of education. A higher (ﬂat) income tax boosts investment in human capital
because total beneﬁts (monetary and non-monetary) are subject to a lower rate of tax
than forgone earnings (Bovenberg and Jacobs, 2005). Hence, a ﬂat tax acts as an implicit
subsidy on human capital investment. Options do make investment less responsive to tax
incentives, but will not aﬀect the sign of the tax impact on human capital investment.
With a ﬂat tax and subsidies on education that are not equal to the tax rate (s 6= τ),
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options do matter for the total impact of taxes on investments. The total eﬀect of a ﬂat tax
on human capital investment consists of both an option eﬀect and the standard positive
impact on the required returns to invest. Indeed, if costs of education are not the same as
the ﬂat rate income tax (s 6= τ) then we can ﬁnd that a higher ﬂat tax (θ = τ) increases the












The costs of the investment are reduced less by a higher ﬂat tax rate than the beneﬁts,
because the direct costs are not lowered by the tax rate. This is the standard eﬀect
in human capital models without options (Bovenberg and Jacobs, 2005). However, the
presence of valuable options reduces the impact of the ﬂat tax increase on the required
return R∗
0. An increase in θ increases option values, and increase in τ decreases option
values, see the earlier discussion. The combined eﬀect is negative and option values
decrease with a higher ﬂat tax rate. Hence, individuals are more inclined to invest
immediately. Due to the lower option values, the impact of ﬂat taxes on human capital
investments is typically smaller with options than without. See also ﬁgure 6 where it is
shown that a higher ﬂat tax reduces the option value of investment in human capital.
An increase in the ﬂat tax rate has the expected negative impact on the marginal return









(1+r)(1−τ)2 > 0. See also ﬁgure
6.
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4.6 Option values and subsidies on education
As a ﬁnal exercise, the eﬀects of larger education subsidies are analyzed. From diﬀerenti-








(1+r)(1−θ) < 0. Higher subsidies lower the costs
of the investments. The marginal beneﬁts of investing directly increase more than the
marginal beneﬁts of postponing the investments. Therefore, the option value of waiting O
decreases and the return at which immediate investments are optimal decreases. See also
ﬁgure 7. This implies that the impact of education subsidies on individuals’ decisions to
consider the investment in human capital is partially oﬀ-set by lower option values. There-
fore, the full impact of education subsidies on educational investment is again smaller than
in the standard human capital model. The impact of lower costs on the investment is that
individuals with lower R0 consider the investment:
∂R0
∂s = − 1
(1+υ)
rκ
(1+r)(1−θ) < 0. Again,
this is the standard human capital result.
5 Conclusions
This paper analyzed the consequences of real options in human capital investments. Hu-
man capital investments are both risky and largely irreversible. It is generally impossible
to recover forgone labor earnings and paid tuition fees. If individuals can inﬂuence the
timing of the investment, i.e., decide to go to higher education now or later, option values
will inﬂuence investment behavior. This paper has shown that with perfect ﬁnancial mar-
kets, the option to postpone investment could explain why returns to education are high,
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why investment in human capital is not very sensitive to returns, taxes and subsidies,
and why students are rightly concerned with low return outcomes. These ﬁndings can be
relevant in explaining various empirical ﬁndings.
Option values can contribute to our understanding of the human capital premium
puzzle. Options may oﬀer an explanation as to why skill-premia for higher educated
workers are high. Returns should be high because they compensate for the lost option
value of waiting once individuals make the irreversible investments in education. This is
an equilibrium outcome which does not require incompleteness of ﬁnancial markets.
This paper has shown that option values tend to make human capital investments less
responsive to the net returns of the investments compared to the standard human capital
model. This may help to explain ﬁndings that enrolment does not appear to be very price
responsive. The empirical picture appears to be that doubling tuition costs will decrease
enrolment rates with roughly 5-10%-points after controlling for selection eﬀects, see recent
estimates provided in Kane (1994, 1995), Hilmer (1998), Heckman et al. (1998), Card
and Lemieux (2000), and Cameron and Heckman (2001), Dynarski (2003).
Option values may also help to explain why returns to education are larger in countries
with larger income inequality, insofar as inequality reﬂects labor market risk.7 In more
risky labor markets, option values of postponing investments in education increase, and
students need to be compensated for giving up the option to wait with higher returns.
OECD (2006) data reveal that income inequality is typically larger in countries with high
7If returns to education are higher, income inequality will also directly increase, so there is also
a reverse causality problem involved here. Katz and Autor (1999), however, show that a large and
increasing part of inequality cannot be explained by education alone.
17Mincer returns to education, as estimated by Harmon et al. (2003). Hence, the data are
not inconsistent with the prediction that larger returns on education should be found in
more risky labor markets.
Option values can be an important reason why students wait with enrolment in higher
education. However, the vast majority of high school graduates immediately enrolls in
higher education. The observation that many students do not wait to enroll may is not a
direct refutation of the model presented in this paper. Students will enroll immediately
as long as rates of return to education are high enough to give up their valuable waiting
option to enroll later.
The analysis of other types of options could be relevant for future research. No re-
search exists on the option to terminate the investment in initial education, i.e., to drop
out, when the investment turns out to be unproﬁtable. There could also be an option to
switch from initial education to OJT investments or from general education to vocational
education in case the latter becomes more proﬁtable compared to the former. There can
also be compound options when there is some combination of options involved in the
investment in human capital. Furthermore, the model of this paper could be cast in a
continuous time framework similar to examples in Dixit and Pindyck (1994). This would
allow for an empirically grounded analysis to study the potential explanatory powers of
the model. One could then also allow for a variety of stochastic processes describing
the returns to the investment. A more in depth treatment of cost uncertainty could
also be analyzed in more detail. This paper assumed that costs were exogenous and
not time-varying. Cost uncertainty is equivalent to what Levhari and Weiss (1974) call
‘input-uncertainty’, i.e., the uncertainty about individual capacities. If cost uncertainty
decreases when the project is undertaken, there may be reasons to start investing imme-
diately even if the net present value is negative. This is related to the growth options in
sequential investments as discussed in Comay et al. (1974) and Heckman et al. (2006).
Further, the impact of options on the distribution of wages would be interesting to inves-
tigate in a general equilibrium setting in which wages of skilled and unskilled workers are
endogenously determined. Finally, interactions of options in human capital investment
with various types of capital and insurance market failures may be a promising avenue
for future research.
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